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Postal traditions are quite old. The early Greeks and Romans had
regular mail systems for communicating with distant military com-
manders or government officials, and the familiar mailbag is said to
have originated with the Phoenicians, predating even the Greeks and
the Romans. The American colonies had a privately operated postal
service by the earlysixteen hundreds, and from 1712 until the
Revolution regular postal service was provided by a wholly owned
subsidiary of the British Post Office. The United States Post Office
was established by Benjamin Franklin in 1775, nearly one year before
the Declaration of Independence was signed. It was one of the initial
agencies of the government, and it has been a government agency
ever since. The Post Office is thus the nation's oldest public enter-
prise. As such, it enjoys a rich history of which it can be justly proud.
With a government-protected monopoly on carrying the mail, the
Post Office has grown to be quite large. In the fiscal year ended
June 30, 1967, expenditures totaled $6.3 billion, revenues were $5.0
billion, its labor force averaged more than 700,000 full- and part-time
employees, its net investment in plant and equipment was estimated to
be $800 million, and the volume of mail handled was over 78
billion pieces—almost 400 pieces for every man, woman and child in
the United States.
The postal system is a widespread network; the United States had
33,121 individual post offices in 1966. At the same time the bulk of
postal operations ishighly concentrated in and between our large
NOTE. Valuable comments and criticisms were received from a number of
people, especially William Sullivan, Arthur Edens and Emerson Markham of the
Post Office Department, and Lewis Gaty of Swarthmore College. The author
assumes sole responsibility for all opinions expressed here.340 The Analysis of Public Output
metropolitan areas. The 317 largest post offices, which constitute less
than one per cent of all post offices, accounted for over 67 per cent of a
all postal revenues in 1966. Looked at from the other end of the scale, U
86 per cent of all offices accounted for less than 7 per cent of all
revenues. Summary data on the distribution of revenues by size of p
office are given in Table 1.
The principal mission of the Post Office is, of course, to receive
mail from senders and deliver it to addressees. However, the Post II
Office also provides a number of auxiliary services. Some of these C
are mail-related: for example, special delivery, registered mail, certi-
fled mail and parcel post insurance. Nonmail special services provided ti'
by the Post Office include the sale of postal money orders, administra- fr
tion of civil service examinations, assistance in taking the census and,
until recently, the postal savings system. In terms of man hours a]
expended or revenues received,all special services taken together w
amount to less than 6 per cent of total Post Office revenues. Because C
these special services ars so diverse and relatively so small, this paper
will exclude them from further consideration and will focus exclusively h
on the value of ordinary mail service. p
One facet of mail service, international rrwil, will not be discussed C
in this paper. International mail constitutes a small part of the total ci
mail picture. In 1966 it accounted for less than 4 per cent of postal
revenues and less than 0.8 per cent of total mail volume. n
TABLE 1









First—large 317 0.9 3,066.9 67.6
First—small 4,307 13.0 1,175.4 25.9
Second 7,125 21.5 207.2 4.6
Third 12,971 39.2 75.2 1.7
Fourth 8,401 25.4 11.0 0.2
Total 33,121 100.0 4,535.7 100.0
SouRcE: U.S. Post Office Department, Cost Ascertainment Report, Washington,
D.C., 1966, p. 89.
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Throughout this paper the postal production function will be treated
of as fixed, an assumption which fits the existing situation well. For years
Ic, the technology observed throughout the postal system has remained
virtually static' and questions concerning the possibility of shifting the
production function would constitute a legitimate and interesting field
of inquiry. Indeed, Congress does perennially inquire whether the
ye Post Office is installing enough new equipment and spendrng enough
money on research and development. Some sharp critics of the Post
Office contend that existing technology offers substantial potential for
ti- mechanizing mail handling and reducing costs. These critics submit
ed that increased mechanization is prevented chiefly (1) by interference
from Congress and labor unions and (2) by the fact that postal
managers have virtually no incentive to reduce costs. Milder critics
irs are less sanguine about existing technology, but they are dissatisfied
er with the Post Office's research effort, and they, too, sense that Post
se Office management has virtually no incentive to make economically
er correct decisions regarding capital-labor substitution. The problem of
how to give proper incentives to managers of large government enter-
prise is obviously very important, as students and critics of the Post
ed Office have frequently pointed out. However, such questions are a
digression from the main purpose of this paper, which is a discussion
:al of the valuation and pricing of postal services under existing tech-
nology.
It should be pointed out that the above questions were under inten-
sive study by the President's Commission on Postal Organization dur-
ing the time this paper was being prepared. Questions concerning the
best organizational form for the Post Office are not considered here
because of the complexity of the subject and because the study by the
Presidential Commission was known to be underway. The Commission's
report, which was not released in sufficient time to integrate into
this study,2 concludes that Post Office management is severely ham-
pered by the present organizational form, and the Commission recom-
mends that the Post Office cease to be a cabinet agency of the govern-
ment and instead become a government-owned corporation more or
less like TVA. The Commission's report3 and the four separate con-
tractor reports (published separately as appendices to the study) are
1Exceptfor developments in air transportation, which the Post Office was in
no way responsible for, but which the Post Office has taken advantage of.
2Anaddendum at the end of this paper gives a summary comparison of the
conclusions of this paper and the Postal Commission's report.
Towards Postal Excellence,Reportof the President's Commission on Postal
Organization, Washington, D.C., June 1968.
SII
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recommended reading for anyone interested in studying postal prob-
lems in depth.
This paper will address itself to the following issues: First, should
the Post Office continue to be regarded as a "natural monopoly," or
should the government allow private firms to offer regular mail service
in competition with the Post Office? Second, how would postal services
be priced under competitive conditions? To provide a substantive basis
for discussing these issues, it will first be necessary to explore the
nature of the Post Office as it now exists.
Postal Rates and Mail Volume
The Post Office now divides all postal rates into four classes. The
basic distinctions between these four classes are summarized in Table
2. The apparent simplicity of Table 2 is, however, a bit deceiving.
Within these four classes Congress has authorized a number of
further distinctions and subclassifications, most of which have the
effect of giving substantial discounts to particular mailers or to certain
TABLE 2
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
FOUR BASIC MAIL CLASSES
Class General Description
of Mail
First Private correspondence (sealed) plus post cards. First
class mail receives priority in handling and shipping.
The privacy of first class mail is considered inviolate,
and mail is forwarded (or returned) as often as neces-
sary to make final delivery.
Second Newspapers, magazines and similar publications which
may be presumed to possess some news or literary
value.
Third Mostlyadvertising matter—commonly called"junk
mail"—plus certain small parcels or other miscellaneous
items weighing less than one pound.
Fourth All parcels or packages weighing more than one pound
and not exceeding the upper size limits.
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types of mail. As a consequence, the Post Office really has twenty-six
—not four—different rate classes.
Some of the distinctions in the rate structure are based on sound
r economic principles. First, the form in which mail is turned over to
e the Post Office can significantly affect the collection, sorting and
processing costs of the Post Office. Large bulk mailings which the
s sender presorts, bundles by Zip code and then delivers direct to the
Post Office loading dock will unquestionably reduce handling costs of
the Post Office. Second, parcels, magazines or similar bulky items have
much greater weight per piece than do letters or circulars. The cost of
shipping letters long distances is small compared to other handling
costs, but this is not true for bulky items. Hence for these latter items
the rate structure should and properly does take account of weight
and distance shipped. Third, the addition of low-priority items to the
e mail system enables the Post Office to even out its work flow and
e utilize more fully its work force, plant and equipment. Despite the
validity of these three economic factors, it ought to be recognized that
economic principles are of limited assistance in explaining the existing
e ratestructure. The determining forces are undoubtedly as much
a political as economic.
A striking feature of the rate structure is the extent of the differ-
ential between various classes of mail. Among the four classes of mail
the highest charge is on first class, the lowest on second class. Rates
for third and fourth class mail fall between these two. To illustrate
= theextent of the extreme differences that exist,if magazines paid
first class rates the cost of mailing a typical issue of Time would be
about 54—60 cents, an increase of between 1,700 and 1,900 per cent
over current rates.
The preceding example may give a slightly unfair picture of the
extremes of the existing rate structure. As stated previously, maga-
zines do not require the same handling as letters, and from a mail-
handling point of view the two are not strictly comparable. To
appreciate the difference in rates for items with similar mail-handling
characteristics, let us compare (1) a 32-page magazine weighing 4
ounces and consisting of 50 per cent advertising, with (2) a 32-page
advertising piece also weighing 4 ounces. Assume both are distributed
nationally in large quantities, both are bundled by Zip code and are
taken by the mailer to the Post Office for distribution. The charge for
mailing the magazine would range between 1.1—2.25 cents per copy,
depending on the distance mailed, whereas the advertising piece would
cost 4.0 cents per copy to mail to any address in the United States.
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TABLE 3
RATES ON SECOND CLASS MAILS
Rate Classification (cents)
Within county of publication (newspapers):
Weekly 1.3 per lb.
—minimum 0.2 per copy
Local city delivery rates:
More often than weekly 1.0 per copy
Less often than weekly, 2 ozs. or less 1.0 per copy
Less often than weekly, over 2 ozs. 2.0 per copy
Outside county of publication
Regular publications:
Editorial portion 3.0 per lb.
Advertising portion:
Zones 1—8 (see schedule) 4.6—15.0 per lb.
Minimum 1.1 per piece
Classroom publications 60% of regular rates
Nonprofit publications
Editorial 1.9 per lb.
Advertising:
Zones 1—8 (see schedule) 2.3—3.5 per lb.
Transient rate 5.0 first 2 ozs.
1.0 ea add'l oz.
Entry fees:
Original entry $30.00—$ 120.00
News-agent entry $25.00
Reentry or additional entry $15.00—$50.00
PL 90-206, December 16,1967, authorized certain step-increases in these
rates, to become effective on January 1st of 1969 and 1970.
The rates for most of the subclasses within second and third class
mail are shown in Tables 3 and 4. These tables illustrate the com-
plexity of the rate structure as well as the variation in rates within a
given class of mail.4
Subclassifications within the second and third class rate structures
givesignificantdiscountstoauthorizednonprofitorganizations.
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the extent of these discounts for second and
Tables 2 and 3 show major rate classifications but omit some detail contained
in the complete schedule.The Value of Post Office Output 345
TABLE 4
RATES ON THIRD CLASS MAILa
Rate Classification (cents)
Single pieces:
Circulars, merchandise 6.0 first 2 ozs.
2.0 ea add'l oz.
Keys and identification devices 14.0 first 2 ozs.
7.0 ea add'l 2 ozs.
Bulk mailings:
Regular:
Circulars, etc. 22.0 per lb.
—minimum 3.6 per piece
Books, catalogs, etc. 16.0 per lb.
—minimum 3.6 per piece
Nonprofit:
Circulars, etc. 11.0 per lb.
—minimum 1.4 per piece
Books, catalogs, etc. 8.0 per lb.
—minimum 1.4 per piece
Annual bulk mailing fee $30.00
PL 90-206, December 16, 1967, authorized a second step-increase in these
rates, to become effective on July 1, 1969.
third class mail. In the fourth class rate schedule discounts are given
to books and records, and even bigger discounts are given for such
mailings to and from libraries, schools and other educational institu-
tions. As there is no indication that the cost of handling mail for non-
profit organizationsis any different than that of other mail with
similar handling characteristics, the rate differences simply reflect
discrimination in favor of certain mailers. It is highly doubtful whether
these rate differentials could be justified in terms of differences in
the elasticity of demand. It is much more likely that they have no
economic rationale whatsoever and instead represent an intentional
subsidy or transfer payment to those institutions or organizations
which benefit from the lower rates.
Table 5 gives data on mail revenues and the volume of mail
handled. It also provides additional perspective on the rate structure.
Table 5 contains 1966 data, the last year for which complete informa-
—ITABLE 5
POSTAL REVENUES AND VOLUME, BY CLASS
OF MAIL, 1966
Revenues RevenueRevenue
(millions Pieces per per
of (millions)Piece Pound
dollars) (cents)(cents)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First class mail:
Regular 2,333.9 40,421.8 5.8 180.97
Airmail 186.5 1,780.5 10.5 231.70
Air parcel post 90.5 47.7 189.9 86.34
Total, first class 2,610.9 42,250.0 15.2a 178.16a
Second class mail:
Magazines 74.5 3,380.9 2.2 4.06
Newspapers—daily 27.0 1,894.0 1.4 3.74
Newspapers—other 5.9 840.1 0.7 3.18
Nonprofit publications 8.3 2,300.3 0.4 2.03
Classroom publications 1.5 108.1 1.4 2.82
Other second class revenues 9.1 110.2 — —
Total, second class 126.3 8,633.6 1.5a 3.92k
Controlled circulation 18.9 347.0 5.46 13.54
Third class mail:
Single-piece rate 200.9 3,347.7 6.0 56.50
Bulk rate, regular 436.2 14,101.1 3.1 32.89
Bulk rate, nonprofit 36.9 2,856.3 1.3 28.41
Fees 7.6 — — —
Total, third class 681.6 20,305.1 3•4a 37.62a
Fourth class mail:
Parcels 784.3 767.7 102.16 15.54
Catalogs 31.1 103.6 30.02 8.07
Special rate (39 USC 4554a) 53.9 202.8 26.56 7.23
Special rate (39 USC 4554b) 1.5 16.1 9.28 1.85
Total, fourth class 870.8 1,090.2 79.87a 14.OOa
All otherb 663.6 3,005.6 — —
-Total 4,972.075,631.5
SouRcEs: Survey o/ Postal Rates, House Document No. 106, Washington,
D.C., 1967; and U.S. Post Office Department,CostAscertainment Report,
Washington,D.C., 1966. Revenue from certain items with different rates, such
—j
TI
TheValue of Post Office Output 347
as post cards, airmail postcards, etc., has been merged into the larger classification.
aAverage.
UIncludesreimbursement for franked government mail, international mail,
special services (registry, insurance, etc.) and other miscellaneous revenues.
tion was available. The revenue figures are therefore based on 1966
rates and do not reflect the current rate schedule, which went into
effect January 7, 1968. The figures in Table 5 show that first class
mail (including airmail) is the backbone of the postal system in terms
of either revenue or pieces handled. In 1966 first class mail accounted
for 56 per cent of basic mail revenue and 56 per cent of all pieces
handled.5
The rate structure shows the maximum which mailers are allowed,
but of course not all pieces of mail weigh the maximum allowed. The
great differences in rates actually paid for various classes of mail are
reflected most strikingly in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, which show,
respectively, revenue per piece and revenue per pound. On a per piece
basis the average postage on a regular first class letter is over
2.5 times more than the postage on a typical magazine (2.26b); the
postage for a typical advertising brochure is about 1.5 times
more than for a typical magazine. Ifallfirst class letters weighed
exactly one ounce, in 1966 the Post Office would have received only
80 cents per pound for first class mail. In fact, it received $1.81 per
pound. Thus on a weight basis, the Post Office realized from first class
letters about 45 times more than from magazines, which paid 4 cents
per pound. Advertising material, at 33 cents per pound, paid about
7.5 times more than magazines. These figures give some indication of
the extent of the subsidies Congress is willing to pay in order to have
magazines and newspapers distributed via the mail.
The postal rate structure reflects a number of different concepts.
For first class mail, rates are based on the presumption that the
service rendered has a high value to users and that enough should be
charged to attempt to eliminate the deficit incurred on other classes of
mail. In other words, first class rates reflect a "value of service" con-
cept administered by a benevolent monopolist who fails to take full
advantage of the inelasticity of demand. For the editorial content of
periodicals and for publications of nonprofit organizations, the infor-
mation which these presumably convey to the public is used to ration-
5Thecategory "Controlled circulation" following "Second class mail" is really
a subclassification of second and third class mail, but it is reported separately by
the Post Office because these periodicals pay substantially higher rates than do
other second class mailers.348 The Analysis of Public Output
alize the substantial loss (or subsidy) which is intentionally incurred.
The advertising portion of periodicals has a rate formula which depends
on both weight and distance, but the maximum charge for magazine
advertising is less than the minimum charge for an equivalent amount
of bulk third class mail. Hence an element of subsidy also underlies
the advertising portion of periodicals.
The rates for fourth class mail are also based upon weight and
distance. For parcels the Post Office charges fees related to both dis-
tance and weight because (1) the law requires that revenues cover
at least 96 per cent (and not more than 104 per cent) of the cost of
handling parcels and (2) competition from firms such as United
Parcel Service makes demand for this service somewhat more elastic.
This competition precludes the Post Office from charging uniform
fees which do not vary with weight or distance shipped. For if it did
attempt to levy a uniform rate which would just cover all expenses
then, since the Post Office does not have any monopoly on parcel
shipments, private firms would almost surely undercut the Post Office
on short-haul lightweight business and let the Post Office carry only
long-haul heavy business at a substantial loss. The Post Office has
avoided this situation by establishing a zone-rate structure for parcel
post.
In addition to the various rate concepts discussed above—value of
service, subsidy to provide information to the public, and weight-
distance—second and third class bulk mailers also pay an annual
permit or "entry fee." These permit fees are quite low in relation to
the regular postage paid by most bulk mailers, but they do add a trace
of a two-part tariff to the rate structure.
Nature of the Demand for Postal Services
About three-fourths of all mail originates in business firms, and a
large portion of all mail is also addressed to business firms. A break-
down of firstclass mail by originator—business and institutional
versus individuals—is shown in Table 6.
It is worth noting that although allfirst class mail is considered
"private correspondence," in fact only a fraction consists of actual
letters. A significant portion of first class business mail consists of
items like bills, credit cards or dividend checks. Each month banks,
telephone companies, gas and electric utility companies, department
IThe Value of Post Office Output 349
TABLE 6






Business or Institutional 75 100 96 80 80
Individual 25 0 4 20 20
Total 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: U.S. Post Office Department, results of a number of unpublished
surveys.
stores, oil companies, etc., send millions of statements through the
mail.
On normal workdays the mailing habits of business cause the Post
Office to be faced with a serious peak-load problem. Throughout the
day secretaries type and prepare letters and automatic equipment
prepares bills, dividend checks, etc. Most of this mail is deposited in
chutes and mail boxes towards the end of the working day, between
3:30 and 5:30 P.M. Half of all originating first class mail is received
at the Post Office between 4 and 7 P.M. The distribution of the
arrival of first class mail at the Post Office throughout the day is
shown in Figure 1. Between the hours of 5 and 9 P.M., consequently,
a typical post office presses all available manpower into sorting the
mail and preparing it for transportation to the area of final delivery.
Between 8 and 10 P.M., most of the outgoing mail is dispatched to the
airport or train station. Then a relative lull sets in until sometime
around 3 or 4 A.M., when mail from other post offices starts arriving
for final delivery. Again, from about 4 to 8 A.M., the Post Office is
pushed to capacity asitprepares all the incoming mail for final
delivery. By 9 or 10 A.M., the large work spaces of the Post Office
are again mostly idle, with only skeleton crews on hand to process
mail from the occasional late-arriving train or plane. Most of the 4 to
7 P.M. peak-loading problem isof course attributable to business
firms since they originate so much of the mail.
The fact that so much of the first class mail from business firms
consists of "bulk" items like bills suggest that the Post Office could
H350 The Analysis of Public Output
FIGURE 1
ARRIVAL OF ORIGINATING-OUTGOING FIRST CLASS





SouRcE: Post Office Department, Bureau of Operations, NIMS Program Re-
port, PFY 1968, Quarter iii.
probablyuse the price mechanism to promote more efficient use of its
plant and equipment. Under competitive conditions one expects that
prices will fall during periods of excess capacity and lower marginal
cost. This has the desirable effect to both society and the individual
firm of utilizing excess capacity and "spreading the overhead." The
Post Office could easily adopt the competitive "solution" to its problem
of excess capacity by offering discounts or rebates to any first class
mailer who would bring large quantities of mail to the Post Office
between, say, 10 A.M. and 12 noon, Monday through Friday. To take
advantage of such a discount, many business firms would be required
to hold overnight the bills or invoices which they prepare during the
day. Under the existing rate structure they have absolutely no incen-
tive to do so. However, there is every reason to expect that large
mailers would react quite favorably to discounts of, say, 2—5 per cent
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in relation to the value of the contents mailed, the total cost of postage
represents a significant expense to many firms.
SECULAR GROWTH OF DEMAND. Mail volume has grown every
year since World War II. For the years 1946—1966 the over-all
growth rate averaged about 3percent per year. Every class of mail
did not change uniformly, however. Mail of the first two classes
increased at about the same rate as the over-all average, but third
and fourth class mail exhibited markedly different behavior.
Since 1953 the advertising portion of third class mail, which com-
prises the bulk of all third class mail, has increased at a compound
rate exceeding 4 per cent per year. The regular parcel post portion
of fourth class mail, on the other hand, experienced a sharp down-
trend after 195 1. The chief causes of this decline were higher rates
plus Congressional limitations on size and weight of parcels, which
diverted many parcels to private carriers. In contrast to the decline
in ordinary parcels, the volume of books and records rose sharply,
undoubtedly reflecting the markedly lower rates for these items.
PRICE ELASTICITY. Although brief, this review of secular growth
12 indicates that demand has grown somewhat faster in those classes or
subclasses where rates are lower. From thisit would appear that
mailers are indeed conscious of postal rates and respond to rate
differentials and changes in rates with a fairly elastic demand. How-
ever, econometric studies of the demand for mail services show that:
Growth in mail volume can be "explained" almost exclusively
in terms of changes in population and real GNP.
After allowing for the effect of population and real GNP, the
demand for mail services appears to be highly price inelastic, mdi-
cating that existing substitutes for mail service are rather imper-
fect.
Changes in the rate differential between first and third class
:e mail has resulted in a measurable shift in the distribution of the
total volume between these two classes, and here there appears
to be some cross-elasticity and substitution.°
6Baratz(1962, PP.4—12)goes into considerably more detail on the studies
and the economic rationale underlying these conclusions. Virtually all econo-
metric studies of the demand for postal service have originated within the Post
nt Office Department, as a consequence of the Post Office Department's obvious
til interest in forecasting mail volume.352 The Analysis of Public Output
An examination of the available substitutes for mail service rein-
forces the conclusion that the demand is probably price-inelastic. To
begin with, first class mail is protected from direct competition by the
so-called Private Express Statutes. These laws give the Post Office
authority to prevent any person or any firm from regularly carrying or
distributing private correspondence. The Post Office enforces these
laws at all times, going so far as to prevent large companies from
carrying intracompany correspondence between different plants on a
regular basis.7 With all competition of this sort totally eliminated, the






Each of these has the advantage of being somewhat faster than mail
service. Except for local telephone calls, however, the cost of each of 4
theabove substitutes is considerably higher than the 6 to 12 cents
charged for most letter mail. But local phone calls are probably used 4
rightnow in preference to the mail. Given the cost of dictating and
typing a letter,it seems unlikely that many letters are written when
a local phone call would suffice.
Certain major components of first class mail will be subjected to
future competition from recent inventions now being developed. This
may increase the elasticity of demand somewhat. Most important will
be the advent of .the so-call "checkless society." This is to be accom-
plished by electronic devices which will enable people to pay their bills
by wire—over the telephone lines perhaps. Also under development
by the Xerox and Magnavox Corporations is a device that will trans-
mit letters, maps, charts,etc., over long distance telephone lines.
Although the cost of this latter device will probably be somewhat more
than six cents per page, it will enable business firms to transmit exact
facsimiles. This is something which existing substitutes do not now
permit, and the cost for such printed messages could well turn out to
be lower than private wire, TWX, or Western Union.
The readership of virtually all magazines is widely dispersed geo-
graphically. A great many magazines cater to special interest groups,
ranging from specialized trade groups to automobile, sports or fashion
S
See,for example, the article on page 1 of the Wall Street Journal, June 5, j
1967.T
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enthusiasts. Some national newspaper and magazines, such as Chris-
tian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek or Time can
usually be procured at convenient newsstands. These latter publica-
tions face considerable competition from television and radio. More-
over, every magazine must compete for reading time of its target
audience. Hence the demand for magazines may be somewhat price-
elastic. Nevertheless, the second most economical method of distribut-
ing magazines to subscribers would probably be far more expensive
than mailing. Since postage accounts for only 15 to 20 per cent of the
regular subscriptionprice, demand for mail service by magazine
publishers is probably inelastic over a price range considerably in
excess of present rates.
One fairly recent development by large national periodicals is worth
noting. Several large mailers now use facsimile typesetting to print
regional editions simultaneously in a number of locations. This practice
probably developed independently of postal rate considerations. Never-
theless, it probably results in saving the Post Office a certain amount
of extra transportation cost since the second class rate structure does
not reflect the full incremental cost associated with moving bulk mail
over long distances, especially distances exceeding 1,000 miles. If the
rate structure were changed so as to reflect true cost differentials, more
magazines might publish regional editions.8 Encouraging such practices
where cost considerations warrant could not worsen over-all economic
efficiency, and it might yield some improvements.
Third class mail is the principal method by which many advertisers
reach highly selected audiences. The chief alternative to direct mail
advertisers seems to be first class mail rather than other media. Though
S firstclass mail is more expensive, it is said to receive more attention
from the addressees. Hence demand by third class mailers may be
elastic, but the Post Office itself provides the competition.
The parcel post portion of fourth class mail has more competition
e from the private sector than any other type of mail. This competition
consists chiefly of United Parcel Service, Railway Express, Air Express
and less-than-carload-lot freight forwarders. It has lobbied long, vigor-
o I
ously,and with some success to place weight and size restrictions on
parcels carried by the Post Office. As noted earlier, this is the only
s, 8Orthey might use nonpostal transportation to the area of final delivery, if
some more economical private arrangement could be made. It is reported that
many publishers take out "multiple-entry permits," which the Post Office has
5, only recently permitted, and by this means they do attempt to minimize their
transportation costs.354 The Analysis of Public Output
class of mail which has shown a year-to-year decline in volume since
World War II. Thus the price elasticity of parcel post is probably
greater than for any other type of mail. But parcel post constitutes only
15 per cent of total revenues and 1.4 per cent of total pieces mailed.
Hence parcel post is not important enough to affect the over-all con-
clusion that elasticity of demand for mail service is probably price-
inelastic, at least around the existing price level.
Postal Costs
Mail-handling technology is a highly labor-intensive activity. This fact
is vividly illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that during the last




LABOR COSTS AS A PER CENT
OF TOTAL POSTAL COSTS
Per cent
19 26—65
SOURCE: U.S. Post Office Department, Annual Report of the Postmaster Gen-
eral, 1966, Financial Supplement, p. 80.j
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all expenditures by the Post Office. For thirty years prior to 1955 labor
costs averaged around 73 per cent, but since 1955 labor costs have
increased to a current rate of around 80 per cent.
The definition of labor costs used to calculate the percentages in
Figure 2 includes direct salaries plus fringe benefits. Labor cost also
includes a 10 per cent differential for night work, plus overtime rates
paid for weekends and time over forty hours. The 10 per cent dilTer-
ential for night work represents a sizable expenditure because a large
number of man-hours are consumed after 6 P.M. on account of the
peak-load problem discussed previously. Actions or policies which
alleviated this problem would thus have immediate and direct payoff
to the Post Office.
Direct payments to common carriers for transportation services
have, during the years 1926—65, varied between 14 and 24 per cent.
This is shown in Figure 3. The combined total of labor and transporta-
Per cent
FIGURE 3
TRANSPORTATION COSTS AS A PER CENT
OF TOTAL POSTAL COSTS
19 26—6 5
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tion cost has been fairly stable, averaging just under 94 per cent for
the last forty years.
Capital spending by the Post Office was almost exclusively on new
buildings prior to 1920. After 1920 the Post Office began investing in
trucks and other vehicles for moving the mail, but prior to 1945 the
Post Office spent virtually nothing on mechanization and equipment
for handling the mail.
Since 1945 spending for mechanization has increased, but itstill
represents a small percentage compared with other industries. In the
last 14 years, for example, mechanization and equipment spending has
accounted for just about 1 per cent of total expenditures, as Figure 4
shows. Spending on mechanization is low either because the capital
equipment presently available does not yield many worthwhile econ-
omies, or because Post Office management has little incentive to install
FIGURE 4
MECHANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT AS A PER CENT
OF TOTAL POSTAL EXPENDITURES
19 54—67
SOURCE:Internal data supplied by the U.S. Post Office Department.I
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cost-saving equipment.5 Regardless of the reason, the Post Office shows
no evidence of mechanizing at either a rapid or an expanding rate.'°
Public protection of monopoly is usually predicated on the assump-
tion that significant economies of scale exist out to and beyond the
point of current operation. For the Post Office, however, the validity
of this assumption appears to be somewhat dubious. Short-run marginal
cost may be low for minimal increases in mail volume, but it appears
that marginal cost increases sharply with substantial increases in
volume.Thisis demonstrated each Christmas when the Post Office is
temporarily forced (1) to authorize a significant amount of overtime
at premium rates, and (2) to add untrained employees who at first are
less productive than regular employees. The supervisory staff is not
adequate to train or supervise so many new employees at once, and,
by the time these added employees become trained, the Christmas
season is over. Since labor accounts for 80 per cent of all postal costs,
the increased unit-labor costs offset any savings that occur elsewhere in
the system." In view of the fact that postal technology is so labor-
intensive, the fact that the short-run marginal cost curve is U-shaped
should not be considered unusual or unexpected.12
Long-run cost behavior is more difficult to ascertain. Direct evidence
on this question is unfortunately lacking. Productivity is known to vary
between facilities, and as a general rule productivity is greater in
smaller offices than in larger offices. But itis impossible to infer the
long-run cost curve of the entire postal system from this sort of evi-
dence. In the long run all costs are variable by definition and the Post
Office is presumed able to adjust capital and labor in whatever way is
The Post Officeissaid to have made a substantial number of pre- and
post-mechanization cost studies which show that mechanization does not pay. It
is not clear whether the results of these studies represent a shortcoming in tech-
nology, failure by management to capture potential cost savings, or simply poor
techniques in estimating payoff from mechanization.
10Statementsthat Congress and labor unions have seriously impeded worth-
while mechanization appear to be inaccurate. This is not to deny that both
groups wield important influence. However, to date Post Office management
has not recommended any large-scale mechanization program for either of these
two groups to thwart or resist.
tiOthercosts also rise at Christmas. For example, extra trucks are rented at
higher short.term rates.Itis not too important whether total "trucking" costs
increase proportionately or less than proportionately with the increase in volume
because they represent such a small part of the total costs.
12Ena few of the most modern facilities it is said that short-run productivity
increases (and marginal cost declines) with increases in volume. The number
of facilities where this occurs is so few, and is expanding so slowly, however,
that it does not affect the over-all conclusion concerning the entire postal system.
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optimal for accommodation of increased mail volume. The question,
therefore, is: Given an increase in mail volume and sufficient time to
make all desired adjustments, what would the Post Office do and will
the resulting unit cost be less than today's average cost? It turns out
that the answer depends upon (1) the composition or mix of the
increased volume, and (2) whether mail service will be allowed to
decline or the current level of service will be continued.
For some insight into this problem of long-run cost, let us examine
the behavior of postal costs along the program lines adopted in the
planning-programing-budgeting (PPB)system. The programs and
1966 costs are shown in Table 7. The Post Office defines its programs
along functional lines, as can be seen from Table 7. These functional
cost categories provide a convenient way of assessing how long-run
costs are likely to vary with changes in workload or output of postal
service.
Acceptance, Category I, contains two principal activities: (1) sell-
ing stamps and (2) picking up mail along collection routes. Virtually
all costs in the acceptance category are assignable to first class mail.
For example, stamps are used almost exclusively on first class mail.
Practically all mail picked up in collection boxes is first class since
(1) mailers deliver all second class and all bulk third class mail directly
to the loading dock, and (2) the public mails parcels at the Post Office
TABLE 7
1966 POST OFFICE COSTS, BY PROGRAM
CATEGORY
Program Category Amount







SOURCE: Percentage breakdown obtained orally from the
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itself. To some extent acceptance costs do not vary with changes in
workload. Only with large increases in first or fourth class mail by the
general public, such as now occurs only during the Christmas season,
would the Post Office find it necessary to increase window services in
order to alleviate severe queuing problems.
Mail Processing, Category II, is composed solely of costs incurred
at major processing facilities. These are usually sizable establishments
in principal cities. The main post office in Chicago, for example, has
about 15,000 full-time employees who do nothing but sort and process
mail. In a major processing facility originating mail typically goes
through the following distinct operations:
Operation Mail Affected
1. Edging-stacking "Loose" first and third class
2. Facing-cancelling Nonmetered first and third class
3. Sorting All mail not presorted and bundled
by Zip code area
Despite all research and development efforts to date, mail processing
in today's Post Office remains highly labor-intensive. Facing-canceffing
is the only operation which has been more or less mechanized. Sorting
of mail, which accounts for most of the costs in Category II, is done
almost entirely by hand.'3 The principal capital costs associated with
the sorting operation are (I) annual depreciation of the "cases," which
probably amounts to between one and three dollars per man, and (2)
the cost of the building itself. Observers have speculated that only
Chinese agriculture is more labor-intensive.
Processing costs clearly vary with changes in workload. However,
since so much second and third class mail is presorted and handled
as bundles rather than as individual pieces, the extent of the variation
in total processing cost will depend on the "mix" of any increased
volume. But if the mix remains unchanged and the Post Office has to
sort additional mail with the same service now given existing mail,
then itis safe to say that processing costs will either increase pro-
portionately or more than proportionately. In order to handle per-
manent increases in mail volume, the Post Office will have to hire
additional workers, and additional facilities will also be required since
major postal facilities are already jammed to capacity during peak
periods.
Thechief exception is parcels, where various mechanical devices are em-
ployed to help speed the sorting operation.
-JI
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Delivery, Category III, comprises about 42 per cent of all postal
costs. Delivery cost is the only common cost of major significance in
the postal system. Special interest groups such as second and third
class mailers have focused attention on the relationship between work-
load and delivery cost. These groups traditionally maintain that the
entire cost of delivery should be charged to first class mail on the
grounds that delivery costs would be unchanged ifthere were no
second or third class mail. In other words, they claim that delivery
costs are not workload-related. But under no circumstances is their
argument entirely correct.
A carrier is given eight hours to (1) sort and prepare for delivery
of all mail on his route, (2) go from the Post Office to his route, (3)
make delivery to all patrons on the route, and (4) return to the Post
Office. Only items (2) and (4) can be treated as entirely invariant
with regard to the amount of second and third class mail. On average,
sorting and preparation of mail for final delivery require over two
hours of a carrier's time. This part of a carrier's job is obviously work-
load-related, and the time which it requires will unquestionably in-
crease as per capita mail volume increases. Similarly, the number of
stops which.a carrier must actually make will, on a statistical basis,
increase as the per capita volume of mail in the system increases. It is
undoubtedly true that delivery costs do not vary proportionately with
increases in the volume of mail handled, but neither are they totally
invariant.
Available data are sparse, but on net balance it is reasonable to
assume that the delivery portion of the postal system exhibits some
economies of scale. That is, if the volume of mail for delivery over the
existing route structure increased, delivery costs probably would not
increase proportionately. Where carriers do not have a full load, the
cost of increased mail is chiefly the additional time required to sort
and prepare it for delivery. But as over-all volume increases, a point
is reached where a carrier cannot sort or deliver any more. Then,
given to time to adopt long-run alternatives, the Post Office can make
various adjustments, each of which involves some increase in costs.
Increase the number of trucks depositing mail at storage boxes
along the carrier's route; or
Shorten existing routes; or
Supply the mailman with a vehicle (or a bigger vehicle).
Thus long-run delivery costs are a function both of workload and the
total number of patrons for which delivery service must be provided.The Value of Post Office Output 361
TABLE 8
POST OFFICE PAYMENTS TO COMMON CARRIERS
FOR TRANSPORTATION, 1966
Amount Per Cent (thousands of dollars)















Star Route service 115,035 16.8
Other 34,748 5.1
Total 684,656 100.0
SouRcE: U.S. Post Office, Cost Ascertainment Report, Washington, D.C.,
1966.
Transportation, Category IV, is composed of (1) all costs of trans-
ferring mail (bundling, loading, unloading, etc.) from one processing
facility to another and (2) payments to common carriers. The first
functions are related directly to workload, and their cost will vary
proportionately with changes in the volume of mail.
A breakdown of 1966 paymentscommon carriers is shown in
Table 8. Payments to some carriers vary directly with the amount of
mail shipped, but others do not. Airlines are usually paid on the basis
of ton-miles shipped; hence this portion of transportation cost varies
directly with weight and distance. But domestic airmail service ac-
counted for only 14 per cent of all carrier payments.'4 In 1966 almost
half of all carrier payments were still being made to the railroads.
Bulky items such as parcels, magazines, catalogs and circulars figured
heavily in this railroad traffic. Payments to railroads are sometimes
variable (as occurs when the Post Office pays by the linear foot for a
partial carload), but frequently they are semivariable(this occurs
when the Post Office rents the entire car). Regardless of whether the
14Aircarriers will receive a somewhat larger portion as all long distance first
class mail is shifted to airlift.362 The Analysis of Public Output
Post Office rents entire railcars or pays by the linear foot, it buys rail
services on a "cube basis," not on a weight basis. Thus when rail-
cars are less than full the Post Office can handle additional mail at no
additional transportation cost. In the absence of any data or studies on
economies of scale in the transportation function, one can only specu-
late.It is my suspicion, however, that if all "lumpiness" occasioned
by these semivariable or semifixed costs were smoothed out on a cost-
quantity diagram, the resulting curve would show that payments to
private carriers for transportation exhibit either slight economies or
constant returns to scale for the entire postal system.
Looking beyond the postal system, extra mail may increase social
costs somewhat less as more of our existing transportation capacity is
utilized. In this event, however, virtually all savings (if any) arising
from this source would accrue to the airlines and railroads, and would
not be reflected in the Post Office's cost function.
LONG-RUN COST BEHAVIOR: SUMMARY. The preceding review
of the behavior of various categories of postal costs, summarized in
Table 9, enables some inferences to be drawn about the extent of
economies of scale in the postal system. In the absence of better data,
it seems reasonable to conclude that within the context of existing
technology the postal production function exhibits some economies of
scale. These economies do not result from any large-scale technology
but simply from increasing the utilization of underutilized overhead
LONG RUN
TABLE 9
COST BEHAVIOR IN THE POST OFFICE
Category Per Cent of
Total Cost
. Extentof Economies of Scale
I.Acceptance 9 Significant
II.Processing 27 Probably none; perhaps slightly increasing
costs
III.Delivery 42 Some
IV.Transportation 16 Probably none; perhaps a few
V.Other 6 Unknown; these costs mostly not workload-
related
Total 100 Some, but not extensive9-
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which must exist in order to provide service to the entire postal system.
But such excess capacity as exists does not occur uniformly through-
out the system. Excess capacity is most notable in delivery service to
the less densely settled areas of the country. Also, residential carriers
probably have some excess capacity, especially along delivery routes in
the suburbs where there are no apartment houses. This result agrees
generally with Baratz (1962, pp. 30—33), who has analyzed certain
available data and has also conducted an extensive survey of the
literature on this subject.
If the postal production function does not exhibit significant econ-
omies of scale, as surmised here, an important policy issue arises:
Should the Private Express Statutes be repealed? Repeal would end
the Post Office's monopoly on first class mail and would allow private
firms to offer competitive mail service, if any firm so desired. A likely
result of such repeal is that some large firms would carry their own
intrafirm mail between plants and between cities. As noted previously,
this form of private mail service is from time to time detected and
stopped by postal authorities. In addition to this form of competition,
private firms might also attempt to compete with the Post Office in
and between major cities, especially on business delivery routes.'5
Since all realizable economies of scale were reached long ago in the
high density portion of the postal system, competition probably would
not increase social costs. The Post Office admits to a 12 per cent profit
on gross income from first class If this is true, the return on
15Privatecompetition has been observed atvarious times in our history
(especially in the 1840's, 1860's and 1930's), and on more than one occasion
this competition has been instrumental in bringing about significant reductions
in postal rates as well as increased service. For more detail see Kennedy (May
1957).
1GSince1926 the Post Office has regularly determined the cost of handling
each class of mail, and the profit or loss on each class of mail, by means of the
Cost Ascertainment System which allocates to the various classes of mail every
cost of the Post Office, including the salary of the Postmaster General, his
furniture, etc. In the Cost Ascertainment System costs are charged directly to
the responsible class of mail wherever possible (such direct charges account for
17 per cent of total cost) and all other costs (83 per cent of total cost) are
allocated on the basis of extensive samples taken during the year. Such fully.
allocated costs are not useful for questions concerning incremental cost or
economies of scale. Their usefulness for rate.making determinationsisalso
dubious.
A better procedure would be to charge each class of mail with its direct costs
plusall traceable indirect costs,leave all nontraceable costs in an unallocated
overhead account, and then debate the extent to which each class of mail should
cover its own cost and contribute to the unallocated overhead. For further dis-
cussion of the Cost Ascertainment System, see Kennedy (June 1957).T
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investment would be rather high since investment is so low. Hence
private firms which efficiently catered only to the low cost portion of
the market would probably prosper. Of course, if the Post Office
suffered a substantial loss of its first class mail volume, the postal
deficit would then increase further, at the expense of the general tax-
payer. But there is no economic argument why first class mailers should
subsidize other mailers. The likely outcome of allowing private firms
to compete with the Post Office would thus be a number of income
transfers, but not a marked change in social efficiency.i? Competitive
"waste" from duplicate postal services in major cities would probably
be no greater than the "waste" involved in "duplicate" grocery stores
in suburban neighborhoods. Over a long-run period consumer benefits
from competition probably far exceed any short-term waste. Hence it
would appear that on economic grounds the Private Express Statutes
should be repealed.
Pricing for Economic Efficiency
If we assume that all benefits of the postal system are appropriable
either to mailers or addressees, then, with the usual Pareto Model as
a yardstick, competitive prices should reflect the cost of the service
rendered. The postal rate structure deviates from this norm in several
significant ways. To appreciate better the deviations which exist, the
postal system will be examined both by function and by class of mail.
Let us begin with the functional approach.
ACCEPTANCE. As previously discussed, most of the expense asso-
ciated with entering mail into the system is properly chargeable to
first class mailers. But among first class mailers the Post Office spends
considerably more providing acceptance service to some than to others.
For many mailers, such as individuals and small firms, the Post Office
incurs the cost of selling stamps and picking up mail from boxes all
over the downtown and suburban areas. A great number of large first
17Privatepostal firms with strong economic incentives to reduce costs might
very well bring about marked shifts in the postal production function. Certainly
the production possibilities curve could not shift much less than it has over the
last 200 years. As noted in the introduction, however, this paper treats all shifts
in the production function as exogenous.r
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class mailers, though, put postage on their mail with a meter 18 and
then truck it to the rear door of the post office. Mail delivered in this
manner circumvents both the edging-stacking and facing-cancelling
operations inside the post office and goes directly to the sorting area.
Some large mailers may even presort all their "bulk" first class mail.
They do this at little cost to themselves by having their computer
address all pieces in one Zip code area before addressing mail to
another Zip area. Mail arriving at the post office in this condition can
go directly into mail bags for shipment to the office of final delivery.
Were postal rates established competitively, then any mailer follow-
ing the above practices would almost certainly be "rewarded" with a
discount commensurate with the cost which he saves the Post Office.
Any such discount would of course be a positive inducement to large
mailers to carry out those mail handling functions which they can do
more efficiently than the Post Office. By not adopting a "bulk rate"
for first class mail and instead charging everyone the same rate, the
Post Office is not only practicing price discrimination, it is also missing
an excellent opportunity to use the price system to reward and promote
activity which would result in greater over-all social efficiency.
The efficiency gained from presorting is obvious, and the Post Office
is very much aware of it. Note, for example, that the Post Office
requires second class mail to be presorted and bundled by Zip code,
and in order to induce bulk third class mailers to presort their mail,
the Post Office uses the price system in exactly the manner advocated
here for first class mail. That is, third class mail not presorted and
bundled by Zip code is charged individual piece rates rather than the
bulk rate. The minimum differential between the single piece rate and
the bulk rate is 2.4 cents per piece (refer to Table 3 for more detail),
a discount from the single piece rate of over 40 per cent. The differen-
tial between piece rates and bulk rates is so great it may even exceed
the Post Office's additional cost of sorting individual pieces. This use
of the price system is obviously effective—over 80 per cent of all third
class mail was sent at the bulk rate in 1966 (see Table 4).
Inasmuch as the Post Office purports to be more of a benevolent
monopolist than an exploitative monopolist, itis difficult to explain
why it refuses to do more to encourage and reward metering, pre-
sorting and bundling of first class mail while at the same time it adopts
iShas been estimated that it costs the Post Office as much as fifty times
more to take in revenue of, say, $500 million from sale of stamps than from
postage meters.I
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such strong inducements in the third class rate structure. True, the
Post Office is fond of claiming that it treats all first class mailers
equally, and that the "individual citizen" is able to post a single letter
for six cents, just the same as the large mailer. However, individuals
can—and do—post single pieces of third class mail, but when this
occurs the Post Office is rather callous about equal treatment or equal
rights for the "individual citizen."
It is also interesting to note, incidentally, that the "equal treatment"
attitude perpetrates a sort of myth (within the Post Office Department,
at least) that all individuals do indeed pay exactly six cents for their
stamps. This ignores the very obvious fact that a great number of six
cent stamps are bought and then resold through vending machines in
drug stores, hotels and elsewhere for more than six cents apiece.
Clearly the public is willing to pay a price for the sort of convenience
which the Post Office does not and cannot offer, but which certain
entrepreneurs are willing to supply. The stamp resale market renders
an important and valuable service to both the public and the Post
Office by increasing the convenience and accessibility of stamps; yet
the Post Office refuses to give official recognition to this fact by taking
any action—such as offering discounts on large quantities of stamps
which would encourage the practice.
PROCESSING. First class mail receives top priority in sorting and
dispatching. This is as it should be, considering the premium paid by
first class mailers.
Within second class mail itis interesting to observe that various
publications receive two rather different levels of service, regular and
expedited handling (the latter being so-called red-tag service), despite
the fact that all "for-profit" publishers pay according to the same rate
schedule. Red-tag service is given to newspapers, news magazines and
other magazines considered to have "time-value." Newspapers alone
account for about 38 per cent of all second class mail, and when this
is added to the volume of news magazines, it results in about 50 per
cent of all second class mail receiving expedited handling. Among all
magazines a few thus receive priority handling and service equivalent
to that given first class mail, but at no extra cost and despite the
rather sizable loss which is attributed to second class mail. This priority
service almost surely has direct out-of-pocket costs associated with it.
An individual post office hires sufficient workers to enaNe it to process
and dispatch on average all originating priority mail in time to meet
established departure schedules for planes and trains. As the volumer
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of priority mail increases, the number of workers necessary to process
this mail within fixed time limits will also increase.
Expedited handling has other incremental costs, too. Second class
mail receiving red-tag service is transported and sorted on railway
post office (RPO) cars, along with first class mail (where RPO
service still exists). RPO cars are now reputed to be the most expen-
sive method of sorting and transporting mail in the entire postal system,
and mail trains on high density runs such as New York-Washington
have multiple RPO cars. If red-tag service were eliminated the Post
Office could conceivably save money by reducing the number of RPO
cars. It would appear that magazines receiving red-tag treatment are
given a service which far exceeds the rate charged, much less its value.
Were mail services offered competitively this sort of price-service com-
bination would almost surely not exist.
Regular or nonpriority second class mail and all third class mail
are sorted and processed only after preferential treatment has been
given to priority mail. Under normal operating conditions most of this
deferred mail is sorted and sent on its way within 24 hours after being
received at the Post Office. From this point on the postal system does
not subject such mail to any more intentional delays. This means that
second and third class mailers receive substantial discounts from first
class rates for only slight delays in processing.'9 In general, this "de-
ferred service" is as predictable as first class or priority service (a very
important point to many bulk mailers) and it is almost as good. Con-
ceivably the discounts in the rate structure could reflect different
elasticities of demand, but it is much more likely that second and third
class rates are simply a result of political lobbying. There is no com-
pelling reason why prices which achieve political equilibrium should
be the same prices as those which achieve competitive equilibrium.
TRANSPORTATION. Virtuallyallordinaryfirstclass mail which
moves over 200 miles is now sent via "airlift" or "deferred air." For
ordinary airmail the Post Office pays the airlines about per
ton-mile, and for airlift it pays about per ton-mile. The essential
"This is not to say that mail should be intentionally delayed until the differ-
ence in service reflects the difference in rates charged. Planned delays of more
than 24 hours would neither be desired by mailers nor practical for the Post
Office. Major postal facilities are built to handle mail in a flow,andstorage
space is minimal throughout the entire facility. A deferred class of service with
intentional built-in delays of more than 24 hours would probably increase the
Post Office's cost by requiring additional storage space to be leased or con-
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difference between ordinary airmail and airlift is that airlines can refuse
to accept airlift mail if they have passengers or higher-paying air-
freight, whereas the airlines are obliged to take all ordinary airmail on
a first priority basis. Thus those mailers who pay the airmail premium
receive guaranteed service whereas others take their chances. From
time to time the two services will vary, but probably more than 80 per
cent of all long-distance ordinary first class mail is delivered on the
same day it would have been delivered had it been sent via airmail.
Itis sometimes suggested that because of transportation costs the
Post Office should charge more for long-distance first class letters.
However, this suggestion ignores two important facts: (1) the cost of
administering such a differential rate structure would probably be
high; and (2) transportation is but a small percentage of the total
cost of handling first class mail. This latter point can be readily illus-
trated. Referring back to Table 4, note that in 1966 the average
revenue per pound of airmail letters was $2.32. The Post Office paid
the airlines about per pound to send regular airmail from New
York to San Francisco, or less than 15 per cent of the total revenue.
Similarly, on ordinary first class letters the Post Office received on
average about $1.81 per pound and it paid aboutper pound (only
11 per cent of revenue) to airlift mail from New York to Los Angeles.
For shorter distances, such as Chicago-Miami or Chicago-San Fran-
cisco, the transportation cost would be less; and under the higher
postal rates which went into effect in January 1968, these percentage
figures will be reduced even further.
Third class mail, like first class mail, is charged a flat rate per piece
regardless of distance shipped. Price discriminationissignificantly
greater in the third class category, however, since transportation costs
account for a greater share of revenues. Referring to Table 4 again, the
Post Office received about 33 cents per pound for regular bulk third
class mail, which on a weight basis represents only 18 per cent of the
amount received for regular first class mail. Although surface trans-
portation cost is less than airlift, it is not 82 per cent less. Hence, the
ratio of transportation cost to revenue is greater, which suggests that
for bulk third class mail the Post Office should probably adopt a
weight and distance rate schedule like those for second and fourth
class mail. Such a rate schedule would be relatively easy and inexpen-
sive to administer since under existing regulations all bulk third class
mail is delivered to a loading dock for checking in by regular postal
employees. If postal services were offered competitively, such a rate
schedule would probably evolve in the natural course of events.The Value of Post Office Output 369
DELIVERY. Each day carriers sort and deliver all first, second and
third class mail which they receive for the patrons on their routes. At
this point in the system no mailer and no class of mail receives prefer-
ential handling. This is probably as it should be as there are no cost
savings nor is there any other economic rationale for setting aside
and delaying delivery of any mail once it is in the hands of the carrier,
except on those rare occasions when a carrier has more mail than he
can physically handle. Different patrons do, however, receive a marked
difference in both the quantity and quality of delivery service. Business
routes receive at least two deliveries a day, but all residential routes
in the United States receive only one delivery a day.
Moreover, among the totality of residential routes the cost and serv-
ice given to various types of residences differ markedly. Strange as
it may seem, the Post Office has never established a set of residential
delivery standards based on an equal-cost concept, on an equal-service
concept, or on any other economic criterion. Mail is delivered direct
to the door of many families, which is by far the most "luxurious"
and expensive service provided by the Post Office. Houses in many
older suburbs and in virtually all newer suburbs receive only curb
delivery, which costs the Post Office considerably less than door de-
livery. And, in apartment houses, delivery service probably costs the
Post Office less per customer than any other type of residential service.
The cost differences are indeed striking. The Post Office may spend
up to ten times more providing door service to an individual home
than it spends delivering mail to a family living in an apartment house.
Under competitive conditions where people pay according to value
received, suburban families would probably receive some minimal level
of service (curb delivery perhaps), and they would be charged a
monthly or yearly fee for incremental service above the minimum.
Mailers would pay only the postage required for "minimal delivery."
Mailers probably do not care, after all, whether the addressee's mail
is delivered to a curbside box or to his door, so long as it is delivered
promptly to a location which is reasonably convenient and secure.
The suggestion to charge addressees for certain delivery services is
not as novel asit may sound. Incremental pricing schemes which
reflect differences in value rendered to individual customers are ac-
cepted as standard practice with our regulated monopolies. The tele-
phone company, for example, provides "minimal" service with a
standard black instrument. The customer pays extra for additional
service in the form of color telephones, lighted dials, different shapes,370 The Analysis of Public Output
pushbuttons, etc. In view of the political controversy generated by the
sizable postal deficits in recent years, it is somewhat surprising that the
Post Office has never been held accountable for not giving postal
patrons a choice between door and curb delivery, with the customer
paying an additional fee for the cost of the additional service. On
occasion the National Association of Home Builders has mounted
sizable campaigns to generate political pressure sufficient to force the
Post Office to give more door delivery service in new suburbs. The
Post Office has resisted these pressures, but an equally simple and
more expedient way of dealing with such pressures would seem to be
use of the price mechanism along the lines recommended here.
PARCEL POST. The preceding discussion of functions omitted any
reference to fourth class mail because parcel handling is almost a
separate subsystem within the over-all postal system. Parcels, because
of their odd sizes, shapes and weight, are always sorted and handled
separately from other mail. Long-distance parcels are usually shipped
via rail on a space-distance basis, and in all major cities parcels are
delivered by separate delivery trucks, independent of the regular route
carrier. Only in small cities and on rural routes, which account for a
small and declining percentage of all mail, are parcels delivered along
with other mail. Because of the law which says that parcel post must be
self-supporting, and because of competition from the private sector,
the basic parcel post system is structured along fairly rational economic
lines. Exceptions do exist, however. Congress has on occasion yielded
to political pressure from private firms and placed some peculiar
weight-size limitations on the parcels which the Post Office can han-
dle.2° These competitive restraints act chiefly to the detriment of the
consumer and should probably be repealed.
Within the fourth class rate structure, substantial discounts are
given to library and educational materials, books, records or catalogs
on the ground that these items somehow promote the "public service"
more than do other parcels. There is no apparent economic rationale
whatsoever for these discounts, and in a competitive system they almost
certainly would not exist. Among other things, these differential rates
20Smallpost offices (second, third and fourth class post offices) can accept
larger and heavier parcels than can large (first class) post offices, despite the
fact that they are less well-equipped to handle such parcels. The reason for this
anomalous restriction is that Railway Express and United Parcel Service do not
offer any parcel service to the smaller communities served by the smaller post
offices, and Congress is reluctant to deprive these sparser areas of such service.The Value of Post Office Output 371
result in income transfers from retail book stores and record outlets
to book clubs and record clubs which sell direct to consumers through
the mail.21
FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD CLASS MAIL. Mail with different
handling characteristics, different costs and different priority require-
ments would receive differential treatment and pricing under competi-
tive conditions. The interciass differentials in the current rate structure
are based in part on such considerations, but more on the political
power of the press and the lobbying ability of third class mailers, plus
a "public value of information" concept which Congress attaches to
dissemination of news and literature. To achieve competitive pricing
most of these distinctions should be substantially reduced or totally
eliminated.
Intraclass differentials in the second and third class rate structures
also contain many noneconomic distinctions which are now enshrined
with all the virtue which Congress and the Post Office Department
accord to long-standing tradition. One major distinction is between
qualified nonprofit institutions and ordinary private firms or individuals.
Qualified nonprofit organizations are given sizable discounts in the
name of "public service." One familiar result of this discount is the
large volume of mail from nonprofit organizations soliciting gifts or
donations. Under normal competitive conditions discounts on this type
of mail would not exist. In fact, they probably would not even exist
under conditions of regulated monopoly, since nonprofit institutions
generally do not receive discounts on their telephone or light bills.
SUMMARy. The Post Office isa government agency occupying a
monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic position. As one might expect, the
postal rate structure reflects a number of significant departures from
competitive pricing. Even after the shortcomings of the Cost Ascertain-
ment System have been taken into account, it is fair to say that a great
many mailers and addressees are not charged in proportion to the
costs incurred on their behalf.
21Theannual subsidy on this class of mail, based on the Cost Ascertainment
System, is $63 million. An interesting study by McLaughlin (1968, P. 54), which
is a pioneering attempt to apply cost-effectiveness analysis to the Post Office,
points out that if one's primary interest is in promoting "culture," $63 million
would have bought: "1. A 100 per cent increase in the number of books pur-
chased annually by libraries, or; 2. Ten thousand elementary school teachers (an
increase of 1 per cent over the current number), or; 3. Ten thousand four-year
college scholarships(at $1,650 per year), or;4.Sixty-six major symphony
orchestras (an increase of 260 per cent)."
-Jii.
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Generally speaking, first class mail is overpriced and most other mail
is underpriced. On net balance, the total cost of mail service exceeds
the revenues received by a substantial amount. The Post Office has yet
to establish any experience with the new higher rate structure, which
became effective in January 1968, but in 1967 total costs exceeded
revenues by over 20 per cent.
Because the postal system is so widespread (every business firm
and virtually every home in the country is both a sender and receiver
of mail), the net result of a more allocative pricing system is difficult
to calculate. A great number of income transfers would certainly result.
But in addition it is almost certain that a pricing system which better
reflected the cost differences occasioned by different types of mail
would cause certain mailers to adopt practices which would result in
greater social efficiency. It is true that the Post Office recognizes some
of these potential efficiencies and attempts to achieve them either by
regulation or by inducing large mailers to adopt socially desirable
practices out of "good will." But adoption of a "competitive" rate
structure would appear to be a far simpler and less expensive method
of correcting any social inefficiencies associated with the postal system.
Unfortunately, as so often occurs when resource allocation problems
interact with Congress, competitive pricing does not draw much politi-
cal support.
Externalities
The preceding discussion assumed that all benefits from postal service
are distributed directly to individuals or organizations in proportion
to the amount of mail they send or receive. This assumption needs
critical examination.
For over 200 years postal service has tended to be a government
monopoly in every country of the world. Why? Do governments confer
postal monopolies on themselves primarily to raise money, or because
postal systems contain some extensive externalities or public goods
elements omitted from the previous discussion, or simply because of an
historical tradition which has roots elsewhere? The answer to the first
part of this question is straightforward. Governments do not run postal
systems for purposes of indirect taxation because postal receipts rarely
cover postal expenditures in any country of the world. Quite the
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contrary; the citizenry must generally be taxed to whatever extent is
necessary to cover the postal deficit.22
Historical development is certainly one important factor in explain-
ing our government postal monopoly. The British Post Office became
a public monopoly in 1609 primarily in order that the government
might control and censor all correspondence entering and leaving
Great Britain.23 The U.S. Post Office was patterned on the British
model. But over the last 200 years, attitudes concerning government
censorship of the mail have completely reversed. Both the U.S. and
British Post Offices now go out of their way to accord complete pri-
vacy to first class mail. However, like the famous Cheshire Cat who
disappeared butlefthisgrinbehind,the government monopoly
remains long after the original rational disappears.
In addition to historical precedent, is there any economic rationale
to help explain government ownership of the Post Office? Does the
postal system, considered as a whole, contain some externalities or
public goods elements which justify either government monopoly or
the extensive subsidies which the Post Office receives? Indeed, in
years past the Post Office has from time to time been used by Con-
gress to promote various transportation programs generally regarded
as possessing certain public good characteristics. The development of
Post Roads, such as the old Boston-New York Post Road (which
actually ran from Boston to Florida), was furthered by the Post
Office. Less widely recognized but also true is the fact that Post
Officepilotspioneered nightflying.Later,afterthePost Office
switched to commercial airlines for its airmail requirements, Congress
for many years used the Post Office as a convenient means of sub-
sidizing air carriers in order to develop the industry. However, Post
Office support of government-sponsored transportation programs is
strictly historical. Within the Federal Government, responsibility for
major support of all transportation programs except maritime now
lies with the recently formed Department of Transportation and its
constituent agencies.
Turning to the current postal deficit, which exceeded one billion
dollars in1966, one can inquire whether any portion of thisis
assignable to any generally recognized economic externalities. The
postal deficit falls broadly into two categories: (1) subsidies or losses
22Insome countries the postal system is operated in conjunction with other
publicly run businesses, such as the telephone company, and profits from the
telephone system are used to offset postal deficits.
23SeeKennedy, May 1967, p. 94.
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attributable to public service as defined in the Postal Policy Act of
1958, and as amended in 1962; and (2) other revenue deficiencies
not covered under the Postal Policy Act. Following these distinctions,
the presentation of the postal deficitisusually based on (1) the
Postal Policy Act and (2) the Cost Ascertainment System which, as
previously mentioned, fully allocates all Post Office costs except those
attributable to public service. A breakdown of the 1966 deficit is given
in Table 10.
TABLE 10





First class mail — 116.3
Second class mail
In county publications 67.2 —
Nonprofitand classroom publications 116.5 —
Regularpublications — —236.3
Other, md. controlled circulation — —9.9
Third class mail
Single piece rate — —32.2
Bulk rate, regular — —269.5
Bulk rate, nonprofit 99.5 —
Fourthclass mail
Parcel and catalogs — —22.6
Special rate 75.2 —
Governmentmail 0.4 7.1
Free for the blind 2.9 —
Internationalmail 0.3 —16.3
Special services (COD, insured mail, special delivery;
money orders) 55.0
Nonpostal services for other agencies 24.5
Part of the cost of operating of rural post offices and
rural routes 105.5 —
Deficit 547.0 462.4
SOURCE: 90th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 106, Survey of
Postal Rates, Washington, D.C., April 17, 1967, p. 60.
a As defined in the Postal Policy Act of 1958, as amended in 1962.
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Whenever one starts with the premise that all postal costs should
somehow be allocated to the various classes of mail, then, regardless
of whether one uses the Cost Ascertainment System or some other
allocation system, any deficit will always be attributed to particular
classes of Thus the second column of Table 10 assigns all of
the regular operating deficit to the various classes of mail. And any
other system which fully allocates all costs will inevitably make the
deficit appear as a subsidy to one group of mailers or another. Hence
any such system cannot reveal any evidence on the existence of pub-
lic goods or external economies.
The public service portion of the deficitreflectsall arguments
accepted by Congress for subsidizing mail service. In the first column
of Table 10 the various classes of mail have been assigned $362.0
million of the public service deficit, $79.5 million isassigned to
special and nonpostal services, and $105.5 million isattributed to
rural postal service. The $362.0 million deficit assigned to various
classes of mail arises from knowingly and deliberately carrying cer-
tain mail at a discount from the general rate structure and below
cost—that is, by accepting mail from various nonprofit institutions
(an alumni magazine, for example) for less than similar mail from
profit making organizations (an ordinary magazine, for example).
The method of computing this part of the public service deficit has
been sharply criticized, but the critics would simply shift part of the
public service deficit to the other column in Table 10. Hence this
portion of the public service deficit offers no evidence of public goods
or externalities. It simply reflects subsidies or transfer payments, paid
for by the general taxpayer, to those mailers whom Congress feels it
is in the public interest to subsidize.
It can be argued that the various institutions to which Congress
has given postal subsidies in the public interest—for example, schools,
libraries and churches—create a variety of nonmarket benefits which
far exceed any subsidy which they receive from the Post Office. But
questions of whether these institutions deserve to be subsidized by
the government, or the extent to which they deserve to be subsidized,
or whether they should be subsidized directly instead of via the Post
Office, are not relevant to a discussion of whether the postal system
itself contains any externalities or public goods. That is,the postal
system cannot be presumed to contain any elements of public goods
Thus when ones concern is with externalities, the usual technical criticisms
of the Cost Ascertainment System are not relevant to the discussion, as these
almost always aim simply at reallocating total cost. For this reason these criti-
cisms will not be discussed here.r
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just because it serves customers which may exhibit such characteristics.
This conclusion also applies to two other items shown in Table
10:"Special services" and "Nonpostal services for other (govern- e
ment) agencies." Any deficit attributable to these two items reflects
transfer payments to the mailers or users involved, and not external e
economies or public goods inherent in the postal system itself.
e
One major item in Table 10 not related to "class of mail" is the
public service cost of operating rural post offices and rural routes.
This item arises in part because the Post Office has from time to time
a
proposed that a number of rural post offices be closed and equal
service be provided by alternative means but at substantially lower
cost. Itis not known whether such moves could or would reduce
costs by the amount shown in Table 10. This item appears in Table
c
10in part because Congress has resisted this "efficiency approach"
and has instead substituted the "public service" concept. Hence, part
of the public service deficit attributed to this item is something of an
"employment subsidy" for rural postmasters, and not a public good.
The other part of the deficit under this item is attributed to delivery
service on sparsely settled rural routes. At the present time the Post
Office gives delivery service along rural roads which average three 1
patrons for each two miles. When the density is less than this, then
anyone wishing to have his mail delivered must erect a mailbox along ti
the nearest road which has delivery service. In this connection it c
should be noted that under current delivery standards the Post Office
makes no attempt to carry mail to the property line of every rural ii
patron.' Nevertheless, it does deliver mail in areas where the popula-
tionisrelatively sparse, and itis generally acknowledged that the
cost of this delivery service exceeds any reasonable assignment of the
revenues received from such mail. C
Werewe to depend solely on competitive firms to supply postal U
service, it is reasonable to assume that rural areas would either receive S
less service than now, or else they would be forced to pay more for 0
the existing level of service. It is also reasonable to assume that as c
the population density of rural areas increases above the minimum P
required for delivery service, the cost of providing such service will
also increase, but far less than That is, there are g
probably substantial economies of scale associated with rural delivery
service along existing routes. In a sense, then, rural postal service,
Conversely, as the rural population continues to decline, this will probably
have an adverse effect on the Post Office's attempts to reduce its deficit. 1
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which isa small and declining portion of the total postal system,
exhibits a characteristic associated with a "mixed" public good.
In conclusion, the vast majority of the postal system does not
exhibit the usual characteristics associated with public goods. For
example,ifexisting users attempt simultaneously to increase their
consumption of mail service, total postal costs will rise substantially.
Similarly, if new users or patrons are added to the system, costs will
alsorise. And postal services can be extended or withheld from
patrons on an individual basis should there be any reason- or desire
to do so. Only in delivery service to rural areas are economies of scale
so large as to approach on rare occasion a pure public good. Whether
this part of the system justifies the extensive monopoly given the Post
Office is a moot question indeed.
Addendum: The Report of the President's
Postal Commission
The Commission's report, including the four appendices published
separately (hereafter, the "Report"), was released too late for sys-
tematic referencing and integration into this paper. However, a few
observations and comparisons will be given here.
In terms of coverage, the Report treats all major topics discussed
in this paper and it covers several other subjects as well. By far the
most important problem studied in the Report—and omitted here—is
the possibility of downward shifts in the cost curve through greater
technological and managerial efficiency. Regarding this subject, the
Commission concludesthatexisting management proceduresare
unduly cumbersome and complex, particularly rate-setting and con-
struction of major new facilities. The Report estimates that total cost
of the existing postal system could be reduced by as much as 20 per
cent through greater efficiency resulting from improved management
procedures. Based chiefly on this finding the Commission strongly
recommends changing the Post Office from a government agency to a
government-owned corporation.
The Report contains a large amount of useful data, much of it
being the result of original surveys done by private contractors. Both
this study and the Report draw, of course, on the same basic data or
observed "facts." Hence, many observations or conclusions are similar.
Thus:r
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1. Business firms are the chief source of mail, but the Report also
gives data showing that the household sectoristhe major
recipient.
2. Demand for postal services is generally price-inelastic.
3. The Post Office should be regarded principally as a business-type
enterprise, which collects revenues and gives services for the fees
charged. The Commission recognizes that some types of mail—
notably news media—may deserve subsidization in the "public
interest." However, the Commission did not recognize or endorse
any public goods arguments concerning the postal system.
4. Labor costs dominate all other factors involved in the supply of
postal services. Moreover, and regardless of what one may have
read concerning new postal machinery, the Commission con-
cludes as I do, that the Post Office gives no evidence of moderniz-
ing or automating at a rate which will significantly alter the
capital-labor ratio in the foreseeable future.
5. Rate schedules should be substantially revised, and in the gen-
eral directions indicated here. The Commission recommends that
rates be based more on economic criteria and less on political
considerations. It should be noted, however, that although the
Report makes a number of rather specific observations concern-
ing the adequacy or inadequacy of various rates, the Report says
nothing about charging addressees or patrons who regularly
receive a level of delivery service which costs substantially more
than alternative forms of adequate delivery service (e.g., door
delivery instead of curb delivery).
Finally, the reasoning which leads the Commission to favor con-
tinuation of the existing postal monopoly is worth commenting on,
inasmuch as the Report and this study reach opposite conclusions
on the basis of many similar observations or assumptions:
a. Despite the inadequacies of the Cost Ascertainment System, the
Report acknowledges that delivery to central business areas is
"low cost" and that the Post Office earns a substantial "profit"
or contribution to overhead on this part of the system. The
Report accepts the conclusion that if it were not for the Private
Express Statutes vigorous competition would most likely arise
in this area. (The Report refers to such competition as "cream-
skimming.")
b. Although not stated explicitly, the Report appears to recognize
that present mail volume long ago passed the point of discernible
______________
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economies of scale in downtown or central business delivery areas.
Thus the Report does not appear to disagree with my conclusion
that in such districts one or more competitors could coexist
with no significant decrease in social efficiency.
c. A survey taken by one of the Commission's contractors indicates
that many large business firms would prefer to have available,
and would be willing to pay a premium for, a particular type of
mail service not now offered—labeled by the Report "urgent"—
and which would virtually guarantee next-day delivery. Similarly,
for "non-urgent" first class mail (of which there appeared to be
quite a bit) these same mailers would prefer a lower rate over
"next day delivery." Thus this survey indicates that many large
mailers would prefer to have first class mail offer different price-
service options rather than attempt to achieve next-day delivery
for all first class mail.
d. The Report acknowledges that large postal facilities are generally
overcrowded, sometimes grossly. These facilities are probably
operating at a point of increasing marginal cost. Moreover, the
Report implies that given the 10-year period now required to
plan construct major new facilities, this situation is likely
to get considerably worse before it improves. Effective competi-
tion would alleviate this overcrowding and could thus increase
over-all economic efficiency. Moreover, effective competition
might result in more innovation in the means by which mail is
processed (it is certainly unlikely that competition will lead to
any less innovation than in the past!).
e. As noted previously, the Report and I agree that repeal of the
Private Express Statutes would most likely result in competition
in and between the major central business districts. Moreover,
we also agree that private firms are not likely to offer much
competition in rural or suburban areas where the Post Office has
some element of "natural monopoly." Instead of competing,
private carriers would most likely use the Post Office to deliver
any such mail which found its way into their delivery systems.
Thus the Report and this study both conclude that private firms
would have little incentive to increase social costs by competing
inefficiently and uneconomically.
f.In those central business areas where private firms would most
likely compete, the Report and I both agree that the private
firms would attempt to offer large mailers lower rates or more
desirable service on first class mail. Moreover, we both agreer
380 The Analysis of Public Output
that the Post Office could possibly lose a substantial part of this
segment of first class mail. Many large mailers could be expected
to switch from the Post Office to private firms because they would
receive a preferred service, or lower cost. The Report acknowl-
edges that private firms are likely to capture enough of this busi-
ness (i) to make it financially rewarding for them, and (ii) to
affect significantly and adversely the revenues of the Post Office.
g. The Report and I both agree that competition would reduce or
eliminate much of the contribution to overhead now paid by
large first class mailers. In turn, this will either increase the
postal deficit or it will force rate increases on those classes of
mail which continue to use the Post Office in preference to private
carriers.
Thus, while the Report and this study agree on the seven foregoing
points, considerations of social efficiency and concern for consumer
preferences lead me to favor repeal of the Private Express Statutes
whereas concern over financial viability of the Post Office leads the
Commission to favor retention of almost all of the existing postal
monopoly.
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by WILLIAM M. CAPRON
Harvard University (formerly with the Brookings Institution)
Those of us who have applauded the recent "push" to build systematic
analysis into the process of government decision making, which many
of us feel is at the core of the effort begun in 1965 to establish a
planning-programing-budgeting system on a governmentwide basis,
are grateful that there is a Post Office Department. At least this is
true of those of us who have been actively engaged in promoting this
effort to improve the kind and quality of information available to
those who must make decisions on government policies, programs,
and budgets.
The reasons those interested in promoting the use of analysis are
glad that postal service is a federal activity lies in the fact that, at
least at first glance, this seems to be an activity which is sold to users
in the market place and in which there are not significant externalities,
with all, or almost all, of the benefits accruing to the individual users
of the service. As a result the analyst does not have to grapple with
formidable problems of social benefit estimation. Nor need he be
concerned in a major way with income redistribution.
Not only does the "payoff" side of the analysis of the Post Office
operation look to be relatively straightforward, but the production
function seems to be susceptible of measurement and specification.
Thus the analyst can hope to come up in relatively short order with
"hard" analyses which can point to specific improvements in the
operation of this federal activity. And for those interested in establish-
ing the credibility and usefulness of a widespread application of sys-
tematic analysis, some quick payoff applications are very welcome.
It is no secret that there are legions of skeptics throwing cold water
at the corporal's guard of PPBS enthusiasts.
Alas, it turns out that my statement above that the benefit estima-
tion problems are simple and straightforward is an overstatement. As
Mr. Haldi's paper reminds us, the Congress has traditionally used the
postal service as a device to subsidize activities considered to be in the
public interest. Rather than providing direct subsidies to defray dis-
tribution costs of newspaper, magazine, and book publishers—to say382 The Analysis of Public Output
nothing of junk mail advertisers—the Congress has chosen to "jigger"
the rates charged to certain classes of mail and groups of users. The al
result, as Haldi makes clear, is that rates and costs in some cases bear
little relationship to each other. Moreover, since useful analysis re-
quires that we recognize that the Post Office is not producing a single
service, but several distinct services, in an important way this is a case
of joint production and we are faced with a difficult problem of cost as
allocation. Those familiar with business cost and production function th
analysis will not need to be told that joint production poses a serious St
challenge to the analyst.
I thoroughly agree with Mr. Haldi's implication that the public
would be much better served if the Post Office could rationalize its
pricing structure to a "competitive" basis. Regarding the subsidy issue,
there are three separate questions which need to be faced in this bc
connection and itis important to distinguish each from the others: us
First,should an activity be subsidized in order to achieve some ti
legitimate public purpose? Second, if so, should the subsidy be in sa
the form of below-cost mail service? And, third, if we answer "Yes" p4
to both of the foregoing questions, should the subsidy come from the fo
general taxpayer via the appropriation process, or from other users m
of mail service via below-cost prices to the nonsubsidized user and aj
above-cost prices to other users? I am prepared to accept a "Yes" in
answer to the first question above with regard to at least some mail us
service users now subsidized. I am skeptical that a persuasive case th
can be made for a "Yes" answer to the second question, though tra- sis
dition is so strong that subsidy of distribution cost of an activity may
have to be accepted. But, on the third question, it seems very hard
indeed to believe that some users of mail service should subsidize d4
others. In other words, if we are to subsidize some postal users, as an
economist I am certain that this should be done out of general Treasury sti
funds—though I will be forced to qualify this view below. ilb
I have no quarrel with Mr. Haldi's identification of the many th
anomalies in the present structure of postal rates, and the inefficiencies mi
which this structure encourages and abets. At least conceptually—if of
not politically—the present rate structure could be rationalized so of
that there was a correspondence for particular users between what ec
they pay and the costs incurred in providing that service, while main-
taining the Post Office as a regular department of government. How- an
ever, a Presidential Commission which is to report shortly has been ag
investigating the possibility of transforming the Post Office Depart-
ment intoapublic corporation—or the creation of some other bqI
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organizational format which will free the postal service from annual
e and detailed Congressional appropriation and oversight and give man-
agement a good deal of discretion. From a practical standpoint I
hope that the Commission recommends such a change, for I think
e there are at least two important advantages which might be gained by
such an institutional modification. In the first place, the corporation
and its management might be (and should be, in my view) given
the authority to proceed with the rationalization of the postal rate
structure, discussed above.
In connection with the recommendation of the Kappel Commission
that the Post Office be reorganized as a government corporation under
which management would have far more discretion, I need to enter a
caveat to my previous discussion of the subsidy issue. Although I still
is believe that, conceptually, subsidies should come from general Treas-
ury funds, I must recognize that there may be an overriding institu-
tional-political argument to the effect that if the subsidy is relatively
small (it is suggested by some that the subsidy amounts to a small
percentage of total cost) and if we can gain a good deal of freedom
for the management of the postal service by an institutional arrange-
ment which takes the postal system out of the annual Congressional
d appropriation process, then it may be worth paying the price of requir-
ing the rates to reflect price discrimination in favor of those classes of
users the Congress deems deserving of subsidy. But I wouldn't pay
this price if(1) the subsidy were significant (from either the sub-
sidizers' or subsidized view) or (2)if Congress insisted on setting
y the absolute level of rates to be charged subsidized users.(The
alternative, which might be acceptable, would be a Congressional
determination that the subsidy be a certain fixed percentage of cost
of providing the service, leaving management free to set the over-all
y structure and level of rates within this constraint.) This point is an
illustration of the need, which sometimes faces us, to depart from
the dictates of sound economic analysis in order to gain important
institutional and procedural changes, given the facts of the workings
if of our political processes. In other words, some sacrifice of the niceties
0 ofeconomic reasoning may be necessary to make much more important
at economic gains possible.
The second potential gain from the creation of a more independent
and autonomous institution to run the postal service is that the man-
agement might be in a position to achieve substantial economies
through improvement in the production process, and they might
be somewhat better able to resist—where resistance is appropriate—r
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the demands of the postal workers union. Itis a commonplace in
Washington to note that that union has one of the best track records
on the lobbying circuit between the Capitol and the White House. A
side effect of the present political coupling of Congressional decisions
with regard to civil service pay rates with postal worker pay rates has
meant that it has been politically much more difficult to achieve the
kind of adjustment of civil service pay scales necessary to attract and
retain the kind and quality of people necessary to discharge effectively
federal responsibilities.
My one serious question about Mr. Haldi's analysis lies in his
suggestion that we might actually transform the postal service into a
competitive market. He seems to me to give a qualified endorsement
to repeal of the Private Express Statutes, which "would end the Post
Office's monopoly on first class mail and allow private firms to offer
competitive mail service." He bases this position on his conclusion—
again carefully qualified—that economies of scale are not significant in
the production of the postal service. It seems to me possible that
Mr. Haldi has gone astray because, in his attempt to estimate (or at
least infer) the shape of the long-run cost curves, he has confined
himself to costs borne by the Post Office itself. Before I can agree with
him that a competitive market structure would not introduce sig-
nificant inefficiencies, from society's standpoint, I think we need to
consider the total cost functions involved in the sending, receipt, and
"assimilation" of materials distributed through the postal system. And
this requires that we look not only at Post Office Department costs
involved in the system but also at costs borne by users. Moreover, be
has not yet persuaded me that the scale economies internal to the
Post Office are minor. Haldi does recognize, for example, that there
are "some" scale economies in connection with the delivery function.
I suspect that if one considered business firms and individuals who
receive mail and the cost to them the "some" would be "somewhat"
larger. Do we really want three, four, or more "mail deliveries" com-
ing to our doors? While obviously postal service is nothing like tele-
phone service in that there is not the same compelling requirement
that we all be (literally) wired into the same system, nonetheless it
seems to me that there are real "convenience" advantages—which
translateinto cost advantages—in having a single postal delivery
service at least for first class mail. It is worth noting in this connec-
tion that estimates have been made which indicate that we today do
pay a price for supporting a system of competitive home milk deliveries.
The advantages of competition in this case may outweigh the addedI
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costs of several milk trucks traveling down each street. And the
customer has the option of performing the delivery function himself
by purchasing milk at the grocery store. At least for local mail delivery,
3 thecustomer also has this option—one that few select since, even
today's relatively inefficient mail system does provide a service at very
low price "per unit."
I I also wonder if senders of mail, and particularly business firms
(which as Halclj points out are the dominant consumers of mail
service), would not suffer increased costs if they were sending their
s outgoing mail through a number of separate postal services(e.g.,
a bulk mailing with Zip code sort would be more cumbersome and
produce smaller gains in efficiency). Of course, it is possible to con-
t ceive of an industry structure of a number of local monopolies for
r each kind of service. But such a system would certainly add some-
- thingto total costs, if for no other reason than that a fairly elaborate
system of recordkeeping would be necessary in order to keep track of
transactions among these local monopolies. Moreover, it is not at all
clear to me that a system of decentralized local monopolies is really
going to have the competitive incentives to improve service and
h reduce costs at which the Haldi proposal is aimed at achieving.
Thus it seems to me at least possible that the economies of scale
o in the total system are a good deal more significant than those Mr.
Haldi finds internal to the Post Office Department (even if we accept
his judgment that internal scale economies are modest). I should
S hastento add that I am perfectly willing to accept a suggestion that
there may be much more room for the private and competitive pro-
e vision of certain specialized services now provided by the Post Office
e Department. We already have a real-life example of this in the ship-
I. mentof packages. The parcel post system does face competition from
o private firms (or "rivalry," if one is a purist about the term "com-
petition"). Indeed, in this instance one questions the way the Con-
gress has tied the hands of the Post Office Department, limiting the
size of package it may accept in the parcel post system. I would be
it willing not only to see these restrictions dropped so that the rivalry
it between the Post Office, on the one hand, and United Parcel, Railway
h Express, etc., could be given freer rein, but I would be willing to see
3' the Private Express Statutes repealed or at least drastically modified
so that private firms could attempt to enter various parts of the total
0 postal service market. But, as I speculated above, I am not at all sure
S. that such entry would be very effective or widespread if the Post
d Office Department (or a public corporation taking its place) is per-r
1
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mitted to adjust its rates to reflect the costs of various types of service, a
My disagreement with Mr. Haldi is not flatfooted. Postal service is (
certainly not like telephone service (as I noted above), in that in the e
case of postal service there is not a clear-cut and dominant public a
interest in having a single interlinked system (forced by the technology ti
and economies of the system), and I recognize together with Mr. a
Haldi that competition increases the possibility that innovations will ti
be developed which would provide better and more efficient postal (
service. a
Before I close let me note the recent report by the British National p
Board for Prices and Incomes on post office charges.' One is struck
by the strong similarities between the British and American postal
systems. For example, the distribution of costs among the various ti
functions seems to be very much the same in the two countries, and Ic
they are also wrestling with an irrational rate structure. In fact, the Si
report was undertaken in response to a proposal by the Postmaster h
General that rates be increased and modified. The specific modification b
proposedisthe establishment of a "two-tier letter service." The b
present British first class mail system recognizes two categories, defined Y
on the basis of contents, not quality and speed of service. Printed g
matter (e.g., newspapers, magazines, etc.) is handled at a much lower a
rate than letters. Under the new proposal, first class mail of whatever N
content will get priority handling (e.g., delivery virtually guaranteed a
the day after posting anywhere in the country) while second class ti
material may be deferred. The major rationale for thisshift will a
soundvery familiar to anyone who has read Mr. Haldi's paper: it is
expected that the two-tier system will permit a smoothing-out of the
work load over the twenty-four hour period, significantly reducing
the present requirement for nighttime—i.e., premium pay—work. P
It is my understanding that the British report was written, at least tC
in part, by an economist known to many of us—Ralph Turvey. I
think those who know Turvey will agree that this suggests that the
report deserves a careful reading. I was therefore struck by one of the
findings of this study because it buttresses a question that I wish to
put to Mr. Haldi: Because of the "joint product" character of pro-
ducing postal services, how reliable are the presently available attempts
to allocate costs by function and by type of service? The British report
questions the usefulness for decision purposes of the very meticulous
1PostOffice Charges,ReportNo. 58, National Board for Prices and Incomes,
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and exhaustive allocation of costs currently made by the British Post
Office on the grounds that there are enough joint costs and overhead
elements involved to suggest that the allocation of total costs can
only be done by rather arbitrary rule-of-thumb techniques (e.g., in
the British case the salary of the Postmaster General is completely
allocated to the various services and functions). The specific issue is
the relevance of the cost allocations to decisions about pricing policy
(e.g., a system of cost allocation designed for cost control by manage-
ment may not be useful for pricing decisions, especially in a joint
production situation).
I began by suggesting that those of us who hope to see systematic
analysis more widely used in illuminating public decisions welcomed
the existence of the postal service as a federal function because it at
least seemed to offer a set of problems more directly and immediately
susceptible to the kinds of analysis we economists think we know
how to do. And I think that this expectation is supported to a degree
by Mr. Haldi's paper and some of the work which I understand has
been done in the Post Office Department over the last couple of
years—when this output is compared with the typical run of the Pro-
gram Memoranda and analyses produced by other agencies. (It is not
r accidental that some of that work has been useful and good nor that
Mr. Haldi chose this subject for his paper: he was instrumental in
aiding the Postmaster General and his key associates in understanding
the value of, and in beginning to use, analysis.) However, the honesty
and modesty with which he presents this paper indicate that even in
the case of Post Office activity problems of data availability and of
analysis are formidable and that much hard work is still to be done.
His paper also underlines the pervasive importance of the institutional,
political, and "social value" environment and the need for the analyst
to understand this environment if his work is to be relevant.
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